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POST-ZIONIST CRITIQUE ON ISRAEL 
AND THE PALESTINIANS 
PART I: THE ACADEMIC DEBATE 
ILAN PAPPE 
This three-part article describes changes in how Israelis-scholars, writers, 
poets, film makers, and others on Israel's cultural scene-view themselves 
and the "Other. " Part I presents the scholarly debate on Israel's past and 
present that laid the groundwork for the transformation of the cultural 
discourse described in the second and third parts. The debate, launched 
by new findings in the Israeli archives and encouraged by an ideology 
critical of Zionism, also was influenced by sociopolitical and economic 
changes in Israeli society in the wake of the October 1973 war. Te vari- 
ous aspects of the post-Zionist critique-the challenge by the "new histori- 
ans" and "critical sociologists" not only of the Zionist interpretation but 
also of the role of Israeli academia in providing the scholarly underpin- 
nings of this interpretation-are examined. 
DURING THE LAST DECADE, Israeli universities have become the venue for a lively 
debate on Israeli history and sociology. Lately, the debate has been transferred to
the public arena through articles in the mainstream press and even has been 
treated in the broadcast mass media. Moreover, a look at other cultural arenas 
and media reveals that the debate has extended beyond academia into the arts- 
films, poetry, and literature. The most obvious characteristic ofthis debate is the 
willingness of a considerable number of Israeli Jews to reassess the way the 
"Arab" is perceived and treated in past and present Israel. It should be men- 
tioned, however, that the debate has not attracted anyone beyond the "chattering 
and writing classes" of Israeli society; it is an elitist exercise, albeit with wide 
implications for the society as a whole. 
The academic debate in Israel about Zionism began in the 1980s with the ap- 
pearance of a number of scholarly works presenting images of past and present 
Jewish society in Palestine that were strongly at odds with the Israeli public's 
self-image and collective memory. The works challenged the most sacred 
"truths" of Zionism and questioned their validity for the present generation. The 
authors of these works also criticized the role played by the country's academic 
institutions inshaping the Zionist self-image and the Zionist interpretation fthe 
Palestine reality. Directly and indirectly, they deconstlucted the works of those 
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who dominated Israeli academic writing on Palestine's history and contemporary 
Jewish society. 
These scholars have been in the public consciousness long enough to be re- 
garded as a cultural phenomenon in Israel. The local press calls them the "post- 
Zionist" scholars, a term not all of these scholars accept.1 Nonetheless, as this is a 
handy concept for describing the essence of what they are doing, we shall apply 
it broadly in this article not only to all those who have revised or criticized the 
work of the mainstream Zionist academic community in Israel but also to artists, 
novelists, and others using a new cultural discourse. 
The term post-Zionism is a hybrid of anti-Zionist notions and a postmodernist 
perception of reality. It has become a convenient erm that groups together Zion- 
ist and anti-Zionist Jews in Israeli academia and politics. In the scholarly world, 
the terms anti-Zionist and Zionist are largely a matter of self-definition: Among 
this group, the works of those who declare themselves Zionist are generally as 
antagonistic toward Zionism as those of authors openly calling themselves anti- 
Zionist. It is important to note that the "post-Zionist" scholars or "new historians" 
or "new sociologists" are not the first o challenge the Zionist version of Israel's 
past and present. Their precursors, however, were mostly on the left, members 
of the communist party or fringe groups such as MAPAM. The ideological orien- 
tation of these last, coupled with the fact that they were not historians or sociolo- 
gists by profession (Israel Shahak and Benny Beit-Hallahmi, for example, are 
professors of chemistry and psychology, respectively), made it easy to dismiss 
their findings as mere claims of political activists beyond the pale of the national 
consensus. In contrast, the "new historians" and "new sociologists," as scholars 
accredited by official academia to research and teach the country's past, were the 
first o challenge the conventional thinking from within the system. 
As for the "postmodernist" part of the equation, it derives from the tendency 
among some of the group to view the present situation in Israel as a phase in 
which most of the Zionist truths have collapsed but there is no sign of what 
would replace them. Thus, to borrow postmodernist discourse, they have decon- 
structed the reality but are unable to reconstruct i . Some of these scholars be- 
come more confident about the future when they envisage the creation of an 
Israeli rather than a Jewish state: a state for all its citizens. Most, however, confine 
their assessment of the future to a long civil and cultural war between the various 
components polarizing and composing Israeli society. 
Chronologically, the postmodernist critique appeared only after the debate on 
the 1948 war had erupted-a debate that was purely positivist in nature and did 
not involve any serious metahistorical ortheoretical discussion. Hence, we begin 
our survey with the "new history" of the 1948 war. 
THE POSITIVIST CHALLENGE: THE "NEW HISTORLANSw 
Mainstream Zionist historiography in Israel continues to subscribe to an im- 
possible combination of positivist and ideological approaches to history: The 
facts, based on archival material, are employed to prove the moral validity of the 
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Zionist claims. The positivist approach means that those researching the coun- 
try's past and present ignore methodological or theoretical questions that might 
affect heir confidence in the scientific truth of Zionism. Moreover, their esearch 
is pure elite analysis-the deeds of the elite are documented in the archives and 
their version of events is taken as an objective and truthful description of fact. 
This mixture of ideological paradigm, scholarly ethnocentricity, and empirical 
bookkeeping did not begin to be challenged until the 1970s with the revisionist 
historiography ofthe 1948 war, the memory of which still shapes the Israeli self- 
image and national myths. 
Before the appearance of the new works, the 1948 war and the Mandatory 
period as a whole were treated exclusively within the university departments 
teaching Zionist history. For these departments, the events of 1948 were the cul- 
mination of the teleological process of redemption and renaissance of the Jewish 
people. The role of the historian was limited to reconstructing this miracle that 
had begun with the awakening of the national movement in the 1880s and ended 
with the 1948 "war of liberation" against the British. It should be noted that the 
Israeli terminology of the war is constructed carefully so as to confer upon Zion- 
ism the equivalent status of a third world liberation movement-hence a war 
against the Arabs cannot be mentioned in this context. Indeed, the two terms 
used for the 1948 war do not indicate any direct conflict with the Arabs: "inde- 
pendence" from the British (Azma'ut) and "liberation" from the yoke of the Dias- 
pora (Shihrur). 
This does not mean, of course, that the "Arabs" do not appear in Zionist histo- 
riography of the 1948 war. When the story of the 1948 war or the preceding years 
of the Mandate is told, researched, or taught, the Arab side is mentioned as yet 
another hardship with which the Jews had to cope. The message throughout the 
story is clear: The Jews in Palestine won against all odds. The imbalance they 
describe between the fewJews and the many Arabs was never so clear as in 1948 
when, according to their version, the community, consisting of many Holocaust 
survivors who could barely fight, was faced with a hostile British government 
and a united Arab world preparing for a war of annihilation. The victory as 
presented in the traditional historiography was miraculous and was won thanks 
to the ingenuity of David Ben-Gurion and the heroism of the soldiers on the 
ground. The historians were left with the task of recreating this heroism on the 
battlefield while analyzing the tactical decisions taken at that and other 
junctures.2 
The task of describing and analyzing the Arab side of the story was entrusted 
to the Israeli orientalist establishment. On the whole the orientalist cholars were 
more neutral in their research than their colleagues in the "Jewish departments," 
but most of them seemed not to be interested in the Palestinians or the 1948 war. 
Even the most prominent among them, Yehoshua Porath, who provided the first 
balanced Israeli view of the Palestinians, never wrote about 1948; while he 
mined the archives until the year 1939, he lost interest and sympathy in his next 
academic works.3 The few Israeli orientalists who did write about the 1948 war 
avoided dealing with the nakba as a human or national tragedy and showed no 
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understanding of its significance for the Palestinian side.4 Instead, they focused 
on the political and military maneuvering in the Arab world outside Palestine 
before and after the war. Similarly, when more recent generations of orientalists 
dealt with the PLO, they did not (with the notable exception of Moshe Shemesh) 
take 1948 as a starting point. The Palestinians of 1948 were erased from the aca- 
demic scene in Israel.5 
The absence of the Palestinian tragedy from the Israeli historical account was 
indicative of a more general Israeli orientalist view. The historiographical view of 
the Palestinians up to the 1980s was monolithic and based on stereotyping. The 
local population in the late Ottoman period was mentioned only in passing as a 
marginal component in the geographical panorama of the promised and empty 
land waiting to be redeemed. From 1948 until 1967, the Palestinians mostly were 
ignored as an academic subject matter: here and there they were mentioned as 
refugees. Since 1967, they have been depicted as terrorists and a threat, though 
not an existential one. But even in this portrayal, the Palestinians have not been 
granted an independent role, being shown instead as pawns within an all-Arab 
conspiracy to annihilate the Jewish state. There was a reason for this: Recognition 
of an independent (even if small and weak) national group fighting for its rights 
would contradict he Zionist self-image of underdog or the Zionist myth of the 
"few who had miraculously beaten the many." The heroic Zionist story of 1948 
also would be in grave danger if another Zionist claim-that the Palestinians fled 
and did not fight-were to be integrated into it. If the Palestinians ran without 
fighting, then what was so heroic about 1948? And even if the story told is not of 
Palestinian heroism, it still would be one of Palestinian tragedy. The best way to 
deal with this predicament, academically, was simply not to deal with the Pales- 
tinian side of the story and, if possible, not to deal with 1948 at all. 
The first notable change in this situation occurred wllen some Israeli academ- 
ics became willing to treat 1948 as a subject matter, analyzing both sides of the 
story and not shrinking from viewing critically the behavior of all concerned in 
the conflict. The result was a historiographical picture very different from the one 
that continues to be conveyed in the educational and cultural systems in Israel. 
The new picture adopts major chapters in the Palestinian historiographical narra- 
tive, but also adds elements of its own. 
The new portrayal was made possible by the opening of the archives dealing 
with the 1948 war following the thirty-year rule of declassification i Israel, Brit- 
ain, and the United States. But the scholars who delved into the archives also 
were guided by a post-Zionist ideology and perception. In Israel, the research 
took place in the decade following the 1978 declassification-in other words, it 
took place during the Lebanon war and the intifada. Indeed, the nonconsensual 
war in Lebanon and the Palestinian uprising created a clear-cut distinction be- 
tween Israel's peace-orientated camp and the insular expansionist "national" 
camp (as the Likud has defined its political bloc). Thus, the scholars who went 
through the newly declassified material did so after their confidence in their 
country's conduct already had been shaken. 
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Moreover, the intifada opened a new chapter in the Israeli-Palestinian dia- 
logue, conducted mainly by scholars. Surprising as this may sound, this dialogue 
acquainted most of the Israeli scholars writing about their country's past who 
were not connected to radical political groups with the historical version of their 
Palestinian academic counterparts for the first ime. For many of them, this en- 
counter brought the first recognition of the scholarly 
merit of what hitherto had been regarded as sheer prop- Frmn sa~ doas 
aganda. Unpleasant and at times shocking chapters in N 
the Israeli historical narrative were exposed. Above all,br. 
Israeli scholars became aware of the basic contradiction r f 
between Zionist national ambitions and their implemen- f 
tation at the expense of the local population in Palestine. , 4d a w 
Finally, the articulation of a clear national sense of iden- 
tity among the Israeli Palestinians, who played a crucial 
role in reminding the public of the existence of a counternarrative, helped to 
shape the "post-Zionist" agenda of Israeli academia as well. In some cases, the 
recognition of the other side of the story, to the point even of adopting it as the 
true side of the story, was the result of a certain ideological stance; in others it 
was the consequences of adopting a postmodern multinarrative approach to his- 
tory, and in still others it was both. 
The challengers became known as the "new historians" after a term coined by 
one of them, Benny Morris.6 But this term, borrowed from the "new history" in 
Europe, was misleading. The "new history" in Europe was an interdisciplinary 
effort to place diplomatic and elite history in a wider social and nonelite perspec- 
tive. The Israeli "new historians," incontrast, dealt only with elite analysis of poli- 
tics and, like their mainstream predecessors, adhered to a positivist 
methodology. For this reason, they more aptly should be described as revision- 
ists, in the manner of the revisionist school in the American historiography onthe 
cold war. 
Taken together, the works of the "new historians" undermine the Zionist 
claim that the Jewish community in Palestine was in danger of annihilation on 
the eve of the 1948 war. The works describe a fragmented Arab world unable to 
support the inferior paramilitary Palestinian groups in their battle for post- 
Mandatory Palestine. They show how, when the Arab League eventually sent 
forces to the battlefield on 14 May 1948, they were not more numerous than the 
Israeli troops and also were poorly trained and considerably inferior in their op- 
erational capabilities on the ground.7 They demonstrate that an important factor 
explaining the Jewish success on the battlefield was the tacit understanding the 
Jewish Agency had with Transjordan whereby the Hashimites, in return for their 
promise not to enter the Jewish state, were allowed to take over the West Bank 
without a single shot being fired.8 Jewish success on the diplomatic front was 
attributed to a rare cooperation between the two warring superpowers in 1947, 
with each for its own reasons supporting the Zionist cause against the Palestin- 
ian. Generally speaking, the Zionists ucceeded in persuading large segments of 
world public opinion to link the Zionist cause with the Holocaust. Against such a 
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claim, even able Palestinian diplomats-and there were not many in those days- 
hardly could win the diplomatic game. Britain, for its part, joined the general 
global trend, and in February 1948 even decided to support a Jewish-Hashimite 
understanding todivide post-Mandatory Palestine between themselves at the ex- 
pense of the Palestinians.9 
The "new history" also challenges the Israeli myth of the voluntary exodus of 
Palestinians from Palestine. Benny Morris was the first o argue, on the basis of 
the newly declassified ocuments, that many of the Palestinians had been ex- 
pelled-although he did not accept the Palestinian historiographical claim, first 
made by Walid Khalidi in 1961, that the expulsion was part of a master plan.10 
This difference of opinion shows that there is still a gap between the Palestinian 
national narrative and the "new history.""1 
One chapter in the "new history" version that is absent from the Palestinian 
narrative isthe claim that there was a genuine willingness on the part of most of 
the Arab governments and what was left of the Palestinian leadership to negoti- 
ate a settlement over Palestine after the war based on Arab acceptance of the 
1947 partition recommendation and the repatriation of the refugees. Israel is 
shown by the "new historians" as an intransigent and belligerent country unwill- 
ing to compromise or even give peace a chance (they single out the foreign min- 
ister, Moshe Sharret, as the only one willing to exhaust the opportunity for peace 
opened after the war).12 
The "new historians" thus drew, in a pure positivist manner, what they believe 
was the true nature of the Israeli behavior, or rather misbehavior, toward the 
Arab world and the Palestinians in 1948. They drew a picture most Israelis were 
not aware of, a picture that provoked angry reactions from public figures and 
press commentators. I raeli policy before 1967 never before was depicted as ag- 
gressive, to say nothing of being at times brutal and inhuman and quite often 
morally unjustifiable. Although none of the "new historians" dealt with the Israeli 
academia in their works, once the debate became public they openly blamed the 
mainstream academia for concealing from the public these unpleasant chapters 
in the story of 1948. 
FUNDAMENTAL CRITIQUE OF ZIONISM: THE NEW SOCIOLOGISTS 
The research carried out during the 1980s on 1948 paved the way for a more 
fundamental criticism of Zionism and its role in the Israeli academia. More accu- 
rately, the new research-or the press and media coverage of it-made it possi- 
ble for trends that in fact had begun earlier to register on the public 
consciousness. Indeed, a new readiness to look into the essence of Zionism had 
been triggered by the 1973 war, which caused the first cracks in Israel's wall of 
moral smugness and self-satisfaction. More importantly, in the relative calm that 
followed that war, tensions between Israel's multicultural and multiethnic fabric 
on the one hand and the "melting pot" ideal of the founding fathers on the other 
came to the fore. Social and cultural undercurrents ofdissatisfaction a d antago- 
nism in Israeli society erupted in the early 1970s into a social protest against the 
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evils inflicted by the state on the deprived Jewish communities, mostly North 
African in origin. Young and vociferous activists tried to emulate the dissent 
voiced by African Americans and established in the early 1970s their own Black 
Panther movement. The movement represented a social demand for a new and 
fairer distribution of the economic resources of the country and a share in the 
definition of its cultural identity. The protesters failed to move the Israeli Left but 
attracted the attention of the Right, which skillfully manipulated their protest into 
a mass movement hat brought Menachem Begin to power in 1977. The Israeli 
Left lost its natural constituency, but some of its adherents in academia began to 
delve into the movement's causes. 
The Sephardic protest movement was an internal social affair, and as such it 
engaged the interest of sociologists. These last not only sought to reconstruct 
Israel's early history, but also were intrigued by the theoretical nd methodologi- 
cal implications of the development of a social protest movement in Israel. The 
Sephardic social protest movement coincided with a growing sense of national 
confidence among the Palestinians in Israel, and their case fortified the cases of 
others who felt excluded from the Zionist historical narrative and whose chroni- 
cles had been distorted in schools and university curricula. 
From the late 1970s onward, academics, with the help of historical or socio- 
logical research, represented the causes of all the deprived groups as scientifi- 
cally valid. They were less successful as political agents of change in Israel: Their 
attempt o tie together, as they had in their research, the plight of Palestinians, 
Sephardic Jews, and women (as a minority group) so as to create a joint political 
front proved to be a total failure. It remained, nonetheless, a popular vision for 
the more hopeful members of the academic protest movement. These develop- 
ments matured after the 1982 Lebanon war. The public debate about that war 
seemed to encourage novelists, film makers, playwrights, musicians, poets, art- 
ists, and journalists jointly to construct a non-Zionist interpretation fthe past 
and present reality. 
The sociologists' challenge, inspired by global and theoretical developments 
in the humanities, was more relativist and postmodernist in nature. It reflected 
the disenchantment characteristic of many Western academics with the fallacies 
and illusions created by "enlightenment," "modernity," and other Western con- 
cepts signifying the triumph of science and logic over "uncivilized" notions from 
the non-Western world. The challengers here adopted 
the more skeptical approach to truth and data, particu- o 
larly truth and data represented within a national context tm. . e. ... * .. to ... 
by the elite and the court academicians erving it.13 Is- . 
raeli academia is an integral part of Western academia l n ha'. 
and it thus is not surprising that Israeli historians and 
sociologists adopted the same interdisciplinary, skeptical, and subjective view 
toward their own history. It allowed them, as academics, to represent he Pales- 
tinian, the Sephardic, and the feminist side of the story, much as American schol- 
ars wished to represent he multicultural reality of their own society. 
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The "new sociologists," so to speak, were not critical of their predecessors' 
work solely on the basis of the "facts" they presented. They also felt the need to 
reassess the basic paradigms these scholars employed. They pointed to a contra- 
diction between the mainstream Israeli scholars' contribution to nation building 
and the university's mandate to promote pluralized and critical research. The 
"new sociologists" were a more diverse group than the historians. Some were 
more relativist, some were more anti-Zionist. Probably for the sake of conven- 
ience, the sociologist Uri Ram labeled them "post-Zionists."14 
Common to all these challenges was the underlying assumption that collec- 
tive memory officially was constructed through the educational system and the 
media. This assumption began to be voiced in the early 1970s at Haifa University, 
where Israel's mainstream sociologists were accused of employing methodolo- 
gies that suited the Zionist ideological claims on the land and the Jewish peo- 
ple.15 The trend continued in the early 1980s, with more established sociologists, 
such as Baruch Kimmerling and Yonathan Shapiro, exposing, via domination 
and co-optation theories, the dictatorial nd arbitrary nature of the Jewish polit- 
ical system that developed during the Mandatory period.16 These works chal- 
lenged the myth adopted by Israeli historians of Zionism that their leaders' 
actions had been motivated by altruistic socialist and liberal ideologies-as still is 
claimed by the leading historians of Zionism in Israel today.17 
The most significant contribution to the new way of thinking, however, was 
the application of a colonialist perspective to the historical study of Zionism. In 
this, Israel's new sociologists came even closer to the Palestinian arrative than 
the new historians had. The theoretical perspective allowed them to look at Zi- 
onism as a colonialist movement without being accused of adopting unvarnished 
the Palestinian discourse.18 Gershon Shafir econstructed arly Zionism-despite 
such particularisms a  the absence of a proper mother country, the marginal role 
played by capitalist profit and loss considerations, and the movement's national- 
ist discourse and motivation-as a typical colonialist movement in a colonialist 
era.19 Others followed suit, employing theories and methodologies hitherto ig- 
nored by their peers that substituted and substantiated a more blunt ideological 
claim. 
THE NEW WAVE OF CRITICISM 
Following these works, the next wave of scholars opted to deal not only with 
history and sociology but also with metahistorical nd theoretical questions. 
Therefore, they wrote not only about the past and the official historiography, but 
also about mainstream academia's reactions to the "new history." They were im- 
pressed by the harshness of the reactions, and indeed, the reactions had been 
harsh. Two of the most prominent Israeli scholars condemned the challenge as 
signifying the end of academic discourse in Israel altogether.20 At that stage, one 
can note a growing tendency among the "post-Zionist" scholars toward 
postmodernist (i.e., relativist) historiography and multicuturalist nterpretations 
of the social reality in Israel. The very recent corpus focuses-as indeed does the 
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public debate-on the role of academia in constructing a Zionist historiography 
and sociology. This new wave of scholars, who can be categorized as decon- 
structionist inmethodology, aims at exposing the role played by the academic 
establishment in the nation-building process at the expense of freedom of 
thought and self-criticism. For example, these scholars, focusing on official texts, 
the content of museums, ceremonies, school curricula, and national emblems, 
have drawn attention to the way in which the dominant Ashkenazi group and its 
narrative has excised others from the national memory.2' Here, some of the 
scholars employed Edward Said's critique of Western Orientalism. The works ex- 
posed the sociological, anthropological, and historiographical discourses used in 
research on "Arabs'-whether Israeli Palestinians, Egyptians, or Sephardic 
Jews.22 The very grouping of Palestinians and oriental Jews as one subject mat- 
ter, as has been done by Shlomo Swirski and Sammy Smooha, is contrary to 
everything Zionism and Zionist academia ever stood for.23 
Others exposed the role played by Israeli academia in providing the scholarly 
basis for this act of repression and for serving as the scholarly tribunal that un- 
conditionally had accepted the governmental xis of inclusion and exclusion.24 
Of particular importance is the work of Uri Ram, who has examined how the 
Israeli sociological establishment analyzed Israeli society in the past. Ram 
showed how Zionist sociologists elaborated theories to fit notions such as the 
"ingathering of the exiles" and the "melting pot." These theories, which contra- 
dicted the reality of a heterogeneous multiethnic and multicultural society, were 
used to crush any opposition to the domineering Eastern European culture that 
might come from competing cultural directions, uch as the one brought by Jews 
immigrating from Arab countries.25 
The injection of moral and ethical questions into scholarly research on Zion- 
ism and Israel opened the way for a new examination of the Holocaust and its 
impact on Israeli society. This research so far has been of a more positivist na- 
ture, sending scholars back to the archives, but it has involved as well an ideo- 
logical stance that has touched the most sensitive nerves of Jewish society. 
Particular attention isbeing paid to the way the local Jewish leadership behaved 
during the time of the Holocaust. In Tom Segev's The Seventh Million, for exam- 
ple, we find a local leadership, on the very eve of the Holocaust, interested in 
saving only Jews who were willing to immigrate or who were physically and 
mentally capable of contributing tothe success of the community. In Idit Zartal's 
From Catastrophe to Power, we discover the lofty and dismissive attitude of the 
sabras toward the survivors and their plight, an attitude that was to leave deep 
scars in the souls of those who survived the Holocaust and got to Palestine.26 
No less sensitive a subject to be dealt with recently is Israel as a militaristic 
society. Although there is no direct correspondence between militarism in the 
conventional European historical sense and the Israeli case,27 the militaristic na- 
ture of Israeli society has two aspects: its actual influence on the country's con- 
duct, and the way security considerations are exploited for the sake of 
discriminatory policies. 
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Concerning the first, he scholars mainly are interested in explaining the pres- 
ent militaristic character of Israel as a product of its history. In order to do so, 
they had to rely heavily on positivist historians such as Benny Morris, who had 
mined the military archives of both 1948 and the 1950s to record accurately and 
painstakingly the aggression and offenses of the Israel Defense Forces. The "re- 
taliation" policy of the 1950s (Israelis were brought up on the myth that Israel 
never initiates or provokes hostilities) is described by Morris as a brutal and ag- 
gressive form of Israeli expansionism.28 What one might call the "new political 
scientists," meanwhile, provided analyses in which Israel, far from being merely 
acted upon in the regional context, was very much an actor and initiator. Instabil- 
ity and conflict in the Middle East now were attributed not solely to "Arab radical- 
ism" or "Arab intransigence," but to Israeli actions as well.29 
The other side of the same coin has led bold young scholars to slaughter 
Israel's most sacred cow: "security above all." Here we meet the new political 
scientists who reject government explanations that security and national defense 
considerations were responsible for North African Jews being pushed to the geo- 
graphical and social margins of the society, or for the imposition of an apartheid 
regime on the Palestinians who had remained in Israel.30 The policy was ex- 
posed as racist and nationalist. As mentioned before, most of these scholars drew 
parallels between the attitude toward Sephardic Jews and Palestinian Israelis. Ed- 
ward Said's Orientalism influenced many of them to treat Israeli society as a 
whole as an "Orientalist" one.31 
Another development is a growing interest not only in the historical but also 
in the present status of Palestinians in Israel. Critical works on these subjects have 
been written before; what is new is both the expansion of the critical assessment 
of Arab-Jewish relations in the state and the growing number of Palestinian aca- 
demics in Israel willing to address these issues. In the past, given the general 
attitude toward Palestinians, itmust have seemed safer to the few Palestinians in 
academia not to approach such problematic subjects as recent Palestinian his- 
tory. (It is noteworthy that the number of Palestinians teaching in Israeli universi- 
ties is still very small, no more than twenty staff members out of nine hundred).32 
The recent wave has been even less acceptable to the mainstream academia 
than the positivist revisionism of the "new historians." Indeed, the findings of the 
latter, particularly (and in a way exclusively) of Benny Morris, eventually even 
were accepted by a growing number of historians. The neutral terminology he 
used (such as the 1948 war, expulsion, and so on) has been absorbed into the 
public discourse on 1948. His more general reference to Israel's original sin was 
less acceptable.33 Nonetheless, the exposure of Israeli academia to pluralism and 
multiculturalism is legitimizing an academic debate on the essence of Zionism, 
carrying permissible debate beyond the focus on the single (albeit crucial and 
formative in the country's history) chapter of 1948. 
Still, every attempt o discuss the essence of Zionism-either by revisiting the 
early years of the movement or critically analyzing the society today-has been 
denounced as a typical intellectual exercise on the part of self-hating Jews in the 
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service of the enemy. This position has been expressed with particular vehe- 
mence in the public debate in Israel on post-Zionism in recent years.34 
It is noteworthy that the opposition has not come from the Right in Israel, 
which has a very limited representation i the Israeli academia, but from the Zi- 
onist Left. Although this Left accepts criticism of post-1967 Israel, the period 
1882-67 is off limits. Critics of post-Zionism could be heard in the past voicing 
strong opposition to the continued Israeli occupation of the territories seized in 
the 1967 war. This protest, however, far from being anti-Zionist, was based on a 
strong commitment toconsensual Zionist positions; it was this commitment that 
kept the Zionist Left from accepting the fundamental Palestinian positions on 
central questions such as the fate of the 1948 refugees or the future of Jerusalem 
as long as the PLO remained faithful to its strategic oncepts. This position was 
institutionalized when the Peace Now movement came into being in 1978, first as 
a lobby for peace with Egypt and then making an impressive ffort against 
Israel's Lebanon war during the Sabra and Shatila massacre in 1982. The move- 
ment remained active throughout the intifada, became idle and mute during the 
Rabin years, but has been given new life under the Netanyahu regime. 
It should be stressed that the movement's reaction to the Lebanon war and 
later to the intifada did not deviate from the Zionist perception of reality. More 
specifically, Peace Now's criticism was and remains directed only against post- 
1967 Israeli policy; its main concern has been this policy's effect on Israeli mo- 
rale and morality. Many academics gravitated toward the movement, but their 
affiliation did not cause any change in the mainstream scholarly works on the 
past and present situation in Israel and Palestine. Still, it was, as we shall see, a 
beginning from which others, in particular film makers and playwrights, would 
continue and develop their own post-Zionist view of life in Israel. It was only 
when anti-Zionist positions, such as the ones held for years by the Communist 
party in Israel, were adopted by academics that fundamental changes occurred in 
the way Israelis perceived the "Arabs" or the "Palestinians," or indeed the whole 
Zionist project. 
The presentation of the Palestinian and Israeli in the local Israeli media serves 
as an excellent example of the Peace Now predicament. As we shall show in the 
second part of this article, the press, paradoxically, conserves the old prejudices 
and images of Israel and the Palestinians while at the same time serving as the 
channel through which the findings and views critical of Zionist interpretations 
are conveyed to the public. It was through the press that the public became 
aware of the growing critique of Zionism among the different groups comprising 
the culture-producing community in Israel. Most of these groups have remained 
within the limited critique of Zionism typified by Peace Now, but they contrib- 
uted to the decline of the Zionist myth and truth no less than their more radical 
and anti-Zionist colleagues inside and outside the local academia. 
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